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IN THE SllPRF:ME cnuRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF IJTAH, 
Plaintiff-Responrlent, 
-v-
ANGF:LO FERNANDO Ollf:\IF:DO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19049 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with two counts 
of aggravated robbery under Utah Code Ann., E> 76-6-302 (1978). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried before a jury and found 
guilty of two counts of aggravated robbery on February 17, 
l9R3 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
Judge, presiding. On February 23, 1983, •appellant was 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of five years to life in 
the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
on the evening of December 5, lqR2, twn ilCJ'1rav.1ted 
robberies occurred just minutes apart in Salt l.ilke r'ity r 1. 
13, 25). rn both robberies, two masked men entered busi"'"' ) 
and at gunpoint forced the employees to open cash req1c;tprc; 
and then lie face down on the floor while the men removed the 
money (T. 17, 19, 29, 30). A witness who saw the suspect 
vehicle leave the scene of one of the robberies notified the 
police that the car was headed up 5th East (T. 4R l. 
officer ward, a salt Lake City police officer, 
spotted the vehicle coming towards him, and as it went by he 
was able to get a good look at the driver (T. 61). officer 
ward, joined by officers in three other police cars, pursued 
the suspect vehicle until it pulled into a side street and 
collided with a chain link fence (T. 64, 7R). The passengers 
and driver of the vehicle jumped out and fled (T. 78). 
The passengers, Leonard and Joseph Vigil, who were 
later convicted of aggravated robbery, were immediately 
apprehended (T. 65, 81, R2). The driver, who avoided 
immediate apprehension, was recognized by Officer Halterman as 
appellant, whom he had known for three years (T. 77, lnn, 
108). Officer Fierro pursued appellant, coming within fifteen 
feet of him before appellant ran into an apartment complex (T. 
115). Although Officer Fierro did not see which apartment 
appellant ran into, Fierro did hear a lower level apartmPnt 
door slam (T. 115). After securing the apartment comrlex tci 
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that esc,.::i~1P wa<-.; lr'1t1(1ss1~JJe, ~·1>?rr0 and other officers entered 
a lower lPV<'i cqrirthµnt rwrupierl try ,Joyce Vigil, a sister to 
t flt' t '..Jr) rnt· 11 j l 1 '-", t-
" 
( , ;, 1 ! ·r, 1 J 7 J • They found appellant 
]Jl t hf• t1,°-j1 t re' Jr ' "'If 
1 ) q I • l'\S di' i*' l J,:-1 r1t 
'""' 
11rlf1-iP1rcJ, Yolanda Vigil (T. 
r nk"n out of the apartment, 
,Joyce v ir:JI l Sci 1 rJ; "\';µ l l rJ011' t know what he done. He just 
ran in he re" ( T. l q I I. 
Four otficers testified at trial that the driver of 
the vehicle was in fact appellant. Officer Ward saw appellant 
driving the suspect vehicle (T. 6R); at the scene of the crash 
officer Halterman recognizPrl the driver as appellant (T. 77); 
officer Fierro identified appellant as the man he pursued on 
foot (T. 114); anrl officer DeWitt identified the jacket found 
with appellant as the one worn by the man he pursued into the 
apartment complex (T. 1521. 
rn support of appellant's alibi defense, Yolanda 
Vigil and Lisa Rurkhart, Joseph Vigil's girlfriend, testified 
that appellant had spent the evening wit~ Yolanda (T. 218, 
221. 231. 234). Adrlitionally, Jose;:h Vigil testified that 
appellant was not the driver of the suspect vehicle, but he 
would not say who the rlriver was fT. 7n2, 203). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVI DFNCF~ TO SIJPPORT 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION. 
Appellant contends that the evidence introducPd ''" 
the state at trial was insufficient to support a convict i,-,ri 
since the alibi testimony placing appellant with his 
girlfriend created a reasonable doubt as to his whereabouts 
during the commission of the crimes (See Appellant's Brief at 
5, 6). 
When reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence 
claim the Utah Supreme Court has applied the following 
standards: 
This Court will not lightly overturn the 
findings of a jury. We must view the 
evidence properly presented at trial in 
the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict, and will only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable man could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Asay, Utah, 631 P.2d 8fil 
(1981); State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229 
(1980); State v. Gorlick, Utah,. 1;05 P.2d 
761 (1979); State v. Logan, Uah, 563 P.2d 
Bll (1977). 
State v. Mccardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982). 
The independent identification by four police 
officers of appellant as the man who drove the suspect vehiclP 
and then fled from it toward an apartment complex, and who 
minutes later was found in the bedroom of an apartment in th.it 
complex, certainly was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding that appellant was with the robbers, and not 
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It r'rlnnot t)e successfully argued that this 
evidence was sn lcirkinq or insuhstantial that a reasonable 
persor1 \._·r>uld n()t r)(1'-~~1~·lv t1dve rParhPrl such a conclusion 
beyond d rl'-,~asrJnahJc 1(Ju~t. 
More<)'.'er, ['rl'';entati<>n of al1hi testimony does not 
automatically create a reasonable doubt sufficient for 
acquittal. State v. Linden, 11tah, f,C,7 P.2d 1164, 1366 (l'lR3) 
Rather, "The judging of the credibility of the witnesses and 
the weight of the evidence is exclusively the prerogative of 
the jury." State v. Wilson, IJtah, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (1977). 
The jury is not obligated to helieve the evidence most 
favorable to the defenrlant rather than that presented in 
opposition by the state; and the existence of contradictory 
evidence or of conflicting inferences does not warrant 
upsetting the trial court's verdict. 
649 P.2d 91, 97 (1982). 
State v. Howell, Utah, 
Finally, appellant suggests that the evidence 
presented by the state was insufficient ~ince one of the 
officers at the apartment complex was searching for a Tongan, 
not a Puerto Rican, appellant's nationality. However, this 
situation does not negatively impact_ on the sufficiency of the 
state's evidence. Officer DeWitt had heard over the police 
dispatch that the driver was male, with a large Afro, possibly 
Black or Tongan (T. 71). nurinq the pursuit of the driver, 
Officer new1tt ""'J,1 ,,~,, thrit per·s"n was not Rlack and thus 
asked Jf anyone had set'n a Tnn<Ji1n ( T. 234). Si nee both 
Tongans and Puerto Ricans have dark complexions, DeWitt's 
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failure to attach the correct nationality to appellant is <>f 
little consequence when compared to the great weight of 
evidence presented by the state. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO GIVE APPFLLANT' S 
REOUESTED IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION WHEN 
A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION INSTRUCTION WAS 
GIVEN. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by 
refusing to give his requested "Telfaire" identification 
instruction. Twice in the past few months this Court has 
reviewed this issue and in both cases, State v. Archambeau, 
slip op. no. 18996 (decided March 26, 1984) (unpublished), and 
state v. Newton, Utah, P.2d , slip op. no. lCJOfi'i (decided 
April 23, 1984), the Court refused to require a "Telfaire" 
instruction when eyewitness identification is an issue. The 
matter is left to the trial court's discretion if the jury 
instructions adequately advise the jury qn the law. The 
applicable standard of review, established in State v. 
Schaffer, Utah, fi38 P.2d 1185 (1981), and reaffirmed in State 
v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56 (1982), Archambeau, and Newton, 
is: If the jury is "instructed that the burden was on the 
State to prove that the defendant was guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that they were the exclusive juclges of the 
credibility of the witnesses, and that in order to convict 
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they rn11st t1nrl tr1at rlc'fernlant committed all of the elements 
constilut1ncJ the offense," then a special irlentification 
instruct.inn is not rf,quirPrl. "Jewton, at 2. 
As 111 ~i_ci_f_t__':'_r_, the instructions used in this case 
intnrrn•--d the 1c1ry that thr· h11r·ien was on the state to prove 
appellant guilty beynnd a reasonable doubt (R. 84, Instruction 
No. 7), that the jury acterl as the exclusive jurlges of the 
credibility of the witnesses (R. 87, Instruction No. 10), and 
finally that the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt 
that appellant committed all of the elements of the offense 
before convicting him (R. 'lO, Instruction No. l"l). 
Moreover, Instruction No. 24 (See Appenrlix A), which 
was given, is almost identical to the proposect "Telfaire" 
instruction at issue in the Schaffer case. See Schaffer, 638 
p. 2d at l lR 7 n . 1 . It is merely a conctensed version of the 
model identification instruction recommendect in United States 
v. Telfaire, 4fi'l F.2d 552 (0.C. Cir. 1972). Both instructions 
indicate that identification is the key issue, that the state 
has the duty of proving identity beyond a reasonable doubt, 
and that the jury is to appraise the testimony of the 
eyewitnesses by consiclering: ( 1 ) the witness's capacity and 
opportunity to observe the offencler, (2) whether the 
iclentification is a product of the witnf>ss's own recollection 
or knowledge, anrl (11 the consistency of the witness in 
recognizing the rlr"ff·ndrint as a part Jc:ipant in the offense. 
AlthoucJh thP "TPI ta ire"' i n--;tru- 1 1 >re ts len;;thier than 
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Instruction No. 24 and adds a reminder to the jury to cnns1.l<->1 
the credibility of the witnesses, these rlifferences are rniri<>r. 
Therefore, appellant has no basis for complain1n·1 
appeal that the jury was not adequately instructed wit~ 
respect to eyewitness identification testimnny. Aeirl1t1nr•dll, 
he has not shown that he was prejudiced hy the trial cnurt'~ 
refusal to give his requested Instruction No. q (See ~ppenrl1• 
B), which simply is a more detailed version of the instruction 
actually given. That is, there is no reasonable likelihooli 
the verdict would have been different had his requested 
instruction been given. see State v. Fontana, Utah, 
P.2d , slip op. no. 17796 at p.9 (decided March 2, l9R4). 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented by the state, which includerl 
independent identification by four police officers of 
appellant as the man driving the suspect vehicle and minutes 
later apprehended by the officers, was c~rtainly sufficient 
evidence to support appellant's conviction. 
The trial court's refusal to use appellant's 
requested identification instruction was not an abuse of 
discretion; moreover, the instruction given adequately 
instructed the jury with respect to eyewitness identificatinn 
testimony. 
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Fnr these reas<>ns, the state urges this C0urt to 
affirm th•, ver,11ct anci J u<J,dm<"nt of the trial court. 
cubrc1ttP<i this /delay of June, 
OAVTO L. WILKINSON 
,lltt<>rney General 
19 R4. 
c/t ~ :h' ~d/~ 
OAVF A. THOMPSON J 
Assistant Attorney General 
CFPTIFICATF OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy 
of the foregoing Rrief, postage prepaicl, to Thomas A. 
Mitchell, Attorney for Appellant, 333 south second East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, this Jd:._ clay in June, l9R4. 
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APPENDIX A 
One of the important issues in this case is the identifi-
ccit ic'n "f th£' defendant as the pernetrator of the crime. The 
Stare has the hurJcn of pr"ving identity, bevond a reasonable 
do•Jb t . It is not essential that the witness himself be free 
from doubt as to the correctness of his state~ent. However, you 
the jurv, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you mav 
convict him. In appraising the identification testimony of 
the witnesses you should consider the following. 
(a) Did the witnesses have the capacity and opportunity 
to observe the offender. 
(b) Is the identification made by the witness a product 
of his own recollection or knowledge. 
(c) Have the witnesses been consistent in recognizing 
the defendant as a participant in the offense. 
If after considering these factors y~u have a reason-
able doubt as to the accuracy of the identification, you must 
find the defendant not guilty. 
·f I l '> 
:-_ l 
APPF\NDIX fl 
f the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. The State has 
~e burden of proving identity, beyond a reasonatle doubt. It is 
Jt essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to 
~e correctness of his statement. However, you the jury, must be 
3tisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification 
: the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced 
!yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who 
Jmmitted the crime, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
Identification testimony is an expression of belief or 
7ression by the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity 
witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense 
to make a reliable identification later. 
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness, 
should consider the following: 
(1) Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity 
: an adequate opportunity to observe the offender? 
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to 
erve the offender at the time of the offense will be affected 
such matters as how lonq or short a ti"e was available, how 
or close the witness ••a', hO\·> goo3 ••err 11glitinri conditions, 
'" >· no1°; the person in 
past. 
7G 
(2) Are you satisfied that the identification mciclc· , 
the witness after the offense was the product of his ov.·:1 
recollection? You may take into account both the strength of 
the identification, and the circumstances under which the iclr·nt1f1, 
was made. 
If the identification by the witness may have been 
influenced by the circumstances under which the defendant was 
presented to him for identification, you should scrutinize the 
identification with great care. You may also consider the length 
of time that lapsed between the occurrence of the crime and the 
next opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor 
bearing on the reliability of the identification. 
(3) You may take into account any occasions in which 
the witness failed to make an identification of the defendant, or 
made an identification that was inconsistent with this identificaticc 
at trial. 
(4) Finally, you must consider the credibility of each 
identification witness in the same way as any other witness, consider 
whether he is truthful, and consider whether he h~d the capacity 
and opportunity to make a reliable observation on the matter 
covered in his testimony. 
It is again to be emphasized that the burden of proof 
on the prosecutor extends to every element of the crime charged, 
234222 1260 E 6290 S. 84141 
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